Russia's energy policies and Ukraine's NATO candidacy by Imblum, Mark A.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2008-06
Russia's energy policies and Ukraine's NATO candidacy
Imblum, Mark A.













Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
RUSSIA’S ENERGY POLICIES AND 








 Thesis Co-Advisors:   Robert E. Looney 
  David S. Yost 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
June 2008 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  Russia’s Energy Policies and Ukraine’s NATO 
Candidacy 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Mark A. Imblum   
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
NATO enlargement and the European Union’s growing dependence on external energy supplies controlled 
by Russia have simultaneously developed into crucial security issues in Europe.  The emerging interaction between 
Alliance enlargement and energy policies may yet affect Ukraine’s future relationship with NATO as well as Russia 
and even determine which direction NATO takes regarding Ukraine’s candidacy for membership.  As the leading 
natural gas exporter with the largest proven gas reserves in the world, Russia provides more natural gas to the 
European Union than any other supplier.  Eighty percent of Russian-controlled gas (from Central Asian countries as 
well as Russia) transits Ukraine for Europe, amplifying Ukraine’s geostrategic significance.  Russia and several West 
European members of NATO continue to augment their economic interdependence through strategic and lucrative 
natural gas agreements.  The amalgamation of key NATO European states’ strong dependency on Russian natural gas 
and Ukraine’s potential NATO membership makes Kyiv’s political and strategic orientation a relevant and 
contemporary question for the United States and its NATO Allies.  Russian-European energy interdependence could 
lead to a rift within the Alliance regarding Ukraine’s candidacy for NATO membership, but cooperative solutions 







15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
87 
14. SUBJECT TERMS  NATO enlargement, Ukraine, Russia, Europe, European Union, energy, 
natural gas, energy security, economic interdependence, energy policy 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
RUSSIA’S ENERGY POLICIES AND UKRAINE’S NATO CANDIDACY 
 
Mark A. Imblum 
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy 
B.S., United States Naval Academy, 1993 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES 

























Harold A. Trinkunas 
Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs 
 iv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
NATO enlargement and the European Union’s growing dependence on external 
energy supplies controlled by Russia have simultaneously developed into crucial security 
issues in Europe.  The emerging interaction between Alliance enlargement and energy 
policies may yet affect Ukraine’s future relationship with NATO as well as Russia and 
even determine which direction NATO takes regarding Ukraine’s candidacy for 
membership.  As the leading natural gas exporter with the largest proven gas reserves in 
the world, Russia provides more natural gas to the European Union than any other 
supplier.  Eighty percent of Russian-controlled gas (from Central Asian countries as well 
as Russia) transits Ukraine for Europe, amplifying Ukraine’s geostrategic significance.  
Russia and several West European members of NATO continue to augment their 
economic interdependence through strategic and lucrative natural gas agreements.  The 
amalgamation of key NATO European states’ strong dependency on Russian natural gas 
and Ukraine’s potential NATO membership makes Kyiv’s political and strategic 
orientation a relevant and contemporary question for the United States and its NATO 
Allies.  Russian-European energy interdependence could lead to a rift within the Alliance 
regarding Ukraine’s candidacy for NATO membership, but cooperative solutions may yet 
be achieved. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
A major global energy consumer, Ukraine maintains an energy-intensive and 
energy-dependent economy.  Russian-Ukrainian natural gas transactions provide a clear 
indication of Ukraine’s energy dependence.  As the leading natural gas exporter with the 
largest proven gas reserves in the world, Russia provides more natural gas to the 
European Union than any other supplier.  Eighty percent of Russian-controlled gas (from 
Central Asian countries as well as Russia) transits Ukraine for Europe, amplifying 
Ukraine’s geostrategic significance.  Russia and several West European members of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) continue to augment their economic 
interdependence through strategic and lucrative natural gas agreements.  Since 1994, 
when it joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace program, Ukraine has forged close 
relations with the Atlantic Alliance.  Nevertheless, the NATO Allies postponed approval 
of Ukraine’s request for a Membership Action Plan (MAP) at the Bucharest Summit on 
2-4 April 2008. 
The amalgamation of key NATO European states’ strong dependency on Russian 
natural gas and Ukraine’s potential NATO membership makes Kyiv’ political and 
strategic orientation a relevant and contemporary question for the United States and its 
NATO Allies.  This thesis investigates the following questions:  How could Russian-
Ukrainian energy relations affect Ukraine’s NATO candidacy?  To what extent could 
Russia’s energy supplies to West European NATO allies influence their policies on 
Ukraine’s NATO candidacy? 
B. IMPORTANCE 
Ukraine deserves careful study due to its geographic position linking Russia to the 
rest of Europe, its unique demographic make-up with a large Russian-speaking minority, 
its incessant shuffling of power among a few political party elites, and its position as the 
primary transit state of Russia’s natural gas to West European NATO powers. 
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In view of Ukraine’s current geostrategic importance for Russian-European 
energy ties and Russia’s recent array of bilateral energy deals with France, Germany and 
Italy, doubts remain as to the willingness of the European Allies to accept Ukraine into 
NATO, let alone into their more exclusive EU club.  As the prospective pipeline plans for 
all three energy agreements with Russia physically circumvent Ukraine, these NATO 
European powers have displayed a preference to directly enhance the security of their 
energy supplies from Russia, thereby placing Ukraine in a precarious situation.  Russia 
has equally demonstrated a dependence on the European market, buoying its economic 
growth through energy export revenues.  Russia’s interest in pipelines skirting Ukraine 
suggests that Moscow may envisage a more unstable relationship with Kyiv. 
Hence, Russia’s energy supplies and Western Europe’s energy needs are 
interdependent.  Russia depends on its oil and gas revenues from Europe and elsewhere 
to maintain a positive economic growth rate.  Europe strives to diversify its energy 
portfolio, partly in order to limit its growing dependence on Russia.  Russian-European 
energy interdependence could lead to a rift within the Alliance regarding Ukraine’s 
candidacy for NATO membership.  In sum, Ukraine merits close analysis, not only 
because of its intrinsic importance, but also because neither NATO nor Russia, nor 
Ukraine itself for that matter, can predict the direction in which it will turn for greater 
political, economic and military cooperation. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Given Russia’s rising confidence, which has been encouraged by its oil and 
natural gas-fueled economic resurgence, NATO faces even greater challenges with 
enlargement in the post-Soviet space that Russia has traditionally regarded as its “sphere 
of influence.”  The current tensions principally concern NATO aspirants Ukraine and 
Georgia.  At the same time, many of NATO’s leading states have forged greater 
economic ties with Russia.  French, German and Italian energy companies have all signed 
major energy deals with Gazprom, Russia’s state-owned natural gas company, since 
2005. 
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Russia’s skepticism about NATO’s intentions derives from centuries of 
tumultuous relations with Western Europe and its search for, and protection of, an 
identity that uniquely blends European and Asian elements.1  Nevertheless, more than 
fifteen years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia finds itself in a peculiar 
geostrategic position – disadvantaged vis-à-vis its historical conditions.  NATO has 
welcomed all former non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries (finalized with Albania’s 
invitation at the Bucharest Summit) in addition to the three former Soviet Baltic republics 
into the Alliance.  To Russia’s chagrin, the United States has even voiced plans to deploy 
ten missile defense interceptors in Poland and an accompanying radar in the Czech 
Republic.2  To Moscow’s dismay, the current governments of the former Soviet republics 
of Ukraine and Georgia, once components of Russia’s protective layer, are seeking 
shelter under NATO’s collective defense umbrella. 
In view of these European security developments, the bilateral energy relationship 
between Russia and Ukraine has become increasingly complex.  Russia and West 
European NATO members are cultivating greater long-term economic ties through the 
very same natural gas stratum.  Furthermore, the natural gas dispute offers a microcosm 
of the contemporary strains between Russia and Ukraine, which extend into nearly all 
areas of state-to-state interaction. 
In summary these developments lead to some important preliminary conclusions.  
Ukraine, due to a lack of effective natural gas alternatives, remains vulnerable to Russian 
influence while implementing its political, economic and defense reforms.  If Ukraine did 
in fact move closer to NATO, what would that entail for West European ties with Russia?  
Would Russia perhaps use its energy leverage to cut off gas to both Ukraine and West 
European states?  Germany and France led the European members of NATO at the 
Bucharest Summit that favored postponing a MAP for Ukraine and Georgia.  Have these 
European members of NATO consequently exposed Ukraine, their East European 
neighbor, to greater security risks and natural gas cutoffs by Russia?  Will disagreement 
                                                 
1 Robert G. Wesson, The Russian Dilemma:  A Political and Geographical View (New Brunswick, NJ:  
Rutgers University Press, 1974), 10-12. 
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over Ukraine’s 2008 MAP request further divide the Atlantic Alliance when West 
European and Russian energy consortiums complete the proposed pipelines, diminishing 
reliance on transit through Ukraine? 
These particular Russian-European energy projects may severely reduce 
Ukraine’s strategic role as a transit state of natural gas and therefore further weaken its 
political autonomy, economic flexibility and energy security, increasing its exposure to 
Russia’s political and economic coercive measures.  These circumstances lead to the 
hypothesis that West European leaders may continue to pay “lip service” to Ukraine on 
potential NATO (and European Union) membership while attaching greater importance 
to economic ties with Russia.  This potential development could split the Alliance 
between champions of Ukrainian membership (Canada, the United States, and new 
NATO Allies, such as the Baltic states, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia) and 
states more cautious about Kyiv’s membership in NATO and seemingly more conscious 
of their dependence on Russian energy resources (France, Germany, and Italy). 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Recent literature focuses on Russia’s reemergence as a global political force.  
Russia’s political clout stems from economic success through windfall oil and natural gas 
revenues.  Some analysts argue that Russia uses its abundant energy resources not only 
for purely economic reasons but also to regain political influence.  Concurrently, experts 
argue that Russia employs a hard-nosed strategy of “soft imperialism” to recapture its 
ascendancy over former Soviet republics.  Overall, the literature pertaining to this thesis 
covers two areas of study:  Ukraine’s persistent natural gas dependency on Russia and the 
inconsistent course of NATO-Ukraine relations. 
Many authors discuss Ukraine’s heavy dependence on Russian resources to drive 
its energy-intensive economy in heavy industry and manufacturing.  Paul D’Anieri, an 
expert on Ukrainian politics, stresses that Ukraine’s economic prosperity remains 
innately linked to Russia.  While interdependence with Russia is a geographic and 
                                                                                                                                                 
2 Jan Cienski and Demetri Sevastopulo, “Poland demands US air defence system,” Financial Times, 
November 20, 2007, 4. 
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economic necessity for Kyiv, it unavoidably reduces Ukraine’s autonomy.  In fact, 
D’Anieri states, “Ukraine has yet to figure out how to protect all of its primary security 
goals – prosperity, autonomy, and sovereignty.”3 
Ukraine’s dependence on Russia centers on its lack of energy resources, natural 
gas in particular.  Although Ukraine has acquiesced to economic interdependence with 
Russia in order to gain prosperity, in doing so it may become even more susceptible to 
Russian economic coercion.  Indeed, Ukraine may have more to lose as its economy 
makes greater strides, a consequence of international trade.  Moreover, Ukraine’s 
government will strive to avoid disturbing its relationship with Russia for fear of 
economic reprisal.4 
Russia’s use of energy as a means of leverage over its fellow former Soviet 
republics has persisted since the early 1990s.  Ukraine in particular clearly remains 
dependent on Russian energy resources.  Furthermore, Ukraine has not been able to 
locate any viable natural gas alternatives and therefore continues to receive its gas 
predominantly from Russia and Turkmenistan (via Russia). 
Though Russia recognizes Ukraine’s declaration of independence in 1991, it 
nevertheless seeks to firmly retain Ukraine within its sphere of influence.  Ukraine, 
however, has vehemently defended its de jure sovereignty, occasionally suffering 
economically while in turn revealing its vulnerability to Russia.  D’Anieri defines 
autonomy as “freedom from the threat of coercion.”  He observes that Ukraine “cannot 
deal with Russia successfully on the basis of power, but that other policies are even less 
acceptable.”5  Of course, the major dilemma at the heart of Russian-Ukrainian relations 
and Ukrainian political and economic autonomy remains the persistent energy dispute.6  
In her studies on Ukrainian energy, Margarita Balmaceda of Seton Hall University 
concludes that Ukraine will remain dependent on Russian energy for decades.  She 
                                                 
3 Paul J. D’Anieri, Economic Interdependence in Ukrainian-Russian Relations (Albany, NY:  SUNY 
Press, 1999), 200. 
4 Ibid., 200-201. 
5 Ibid., 204. 
6 Ibid. 
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recognizes that Ukraine’s dependency on Russian natural gas entails interdependency; 
Russia also relies on Ukraine as an energy consumer and transit state of its West and 
Central European-bound natural gas.7 
Ukraine cannot optimally diversify its natural gas imports, owing to its limited 
alternatives.  Rawi Abdelal of Harvard University observes that during the Soviet era 
natural gas proved vital to the industrial sector in each of the constituent republics of the 
Soviet Union, ultimately becoming “the single most important resource in the regional 
economy."8  The Soviet Union heavily subsidized gas (and oil) prices, keeping them 
drastically below the world market price and creating economic interdependence among 
the Soviet republics.  With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia offered to continue 
subsidized energy prices to the former Soviet republics as an economic inducement for 
them to align their foreign and economic policies with Russia.  Thus, Soviet-era 
dependency has translated into a strong but turbulent Russian-Ukrainian energy 
relationship. 
The literature also broadly discusses Ukraine’s NATO candidacy.  James Sherr of 
the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom has pointedly observed that prior to 1994 
many analysts and government officials believed that NATO might become obsolete in 
the post-Cold War security landscape. 9  NATO, however, acquired new missions and 
took a transformational path.  In Brussels, in January 1994, the North Atlantic Council 
established the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, foreshadowing NATO’s policy of 
enlargement.  Conflicts in the Balkans since the early 1990s have confirmed that a post-
Cold War Europe did not mean a secure Europe, and the need to address these conflicts 
gave NATO a revitalized and critical mission.10 
                                                 
7 Margarita M. Balmaceda, “Explaining the Management of Energy Dependency in Ukraine:  
Possibilities and Limits of a Domestic-Centered Perspective,” Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische 
Sozialforschung, Working Papers 79, 2004,  2. 
8 Rawi Abdelal, “Interpreting Interdependence:  Energy and Security in Ukraine and Belarus,” in 
Swords and Sustenance:  The Economics of Security in Belarus and Ukraine, ed. Robert Legvold and 
Celeste Wallander, 104-105 (Cambridge, MA:  The MIT Press, 2004). 
9 James Sherr, “The Dual Enlargements and Ukraine,” in Ambivalent Neighbors:  The EU, NATO, and 
the Price of Membership, ed. Anatol Lieven and Dmitri Trenin, 108 (Washington, DC:  Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 2003). 
10 Ibid., 108, 113. 
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Sherr notes that PfP, which was originally intended to “deflect pressure for 
NATO enlargement,” in fact “evolved into an essential instrument of enlargement 
policy.”  One of PfP’s functions became to groom potential candidates for membership.  
PfP has allowed states with no desire to join, such as Switzerland, as well as Austria, 
Finland, Sweden, and former Soviet republics such as Ukraine and Georgia, “to draw 
closer to the NATO fold.”11  Even with Kyiv’s evident rapprochement to NATO, typical 
public opinion polls in Ukraine repeatedly show less than 50 percent support for 
Ukraine’s prospective NATO membership.12 
Concurrently with its enlargement process, NATO has sought closer strategic 
relations with Russia and dialogue on veritable differences such as Kosovo’s 
independence and missile defense.  NATO has also encouraged Russia to return to 
compliance with the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and to honor 
associated commitments. 
Sherr has drawn attention to the “Russia first” policy which took precedence in 
the 1990s in U.S., European and NATO policies alike to incorporate Russia into strategic 
security discussions and partnerships.  This policy remains prevalent in contemporary 
NATO enlargement debates and NATO-Russia relations.13  Paradoxically, Ukraine may 
best capitalize on its past non-alignment policy if tensions resurface between Russia and 
the West.14 
Sherr shares D’Anieri’s idea that Ukraine needs to develop economic flexibility 
that supports its political autonomy.  Without economic diversification Ukraine will 
remain within Russia’s sphere of influence.  Sherr argues that Ukraine must solidify its 
judicial system, as well as property rights, privatization, and taxation reform.  These 
                                                 
11 Sherr, “Dual Enlargements,” 113. 
12 Poll findings vary in recent reports.  Oxford Analytica states “barely half [the Ukrainian population] 
support[s]” NATO membership while a March 2008 Congressional Research Service report states that less 
than one quarter wish to join NATO.  See, respectively:  “Ukraine/NATO:  Kiev’s bid to join presents 
dilemma,” OxResearch, January 28, 2008, 1; and Steven Woehrel, “Ukraine,” in Paul Gallis, Paul Belkin, 
Carl Ek, Julie Kim, Jim Nichol, and Steven Woehrel, Enlargement Issues at NATO’s Bucharest Summit, 
Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, RL34415, March 12, 2008, 22. 
13 Sherr, “Dual Enlargements,” 111. 
14 D’Anieri, Economic Interdependence, 209. 
 8
improvements must take place not only for possible entry into European security and 
economic institutions, but also, and more importantly, for Ukraine to achieve greater 
national cohesion.15 
In conclusion, the literature discusses extensively Ukraine’s high natural gas 
consumption level to support its energy-intensive economy.  As a net consumer and 
importer of natural gas, Ukraine is exposed by its dependency on Russian energy 
supplies.  Moreover, the literature discusses Ukraine’s relationship with NATO since its 
independence in 1991.  Milestones include its PfP membership in 1994, its Intensified 
Dialogue categorization in 2005, and its MAP request in January 2008.  The literature, 
however, does not fully examine the possible relationship between Ukraine’s NATO 
candidacy and (a) Ukraine’s dependence on Russian natural gas (a dependence further 
complicated by Russia’s aggressive and geostrategic natural gas policies) and (b) the 
economic interdependence between Russia and major NATO European importers of 
Russian natural gas. 
Ukraine remains central to the future of European security, owing in part to its 
large land mass and population, access to the Black Sea, and border with Russia.  Owing 
to its unique ethnic makeup, economic potential, and divided history between Russia and 
the rest of Europe, Ukraine is at the center of some of contemporary Europe’s most 
essential policy debates and issues, such as energy security, NATO and EU enlargement, 
the West’s relations with Russia, and U.S. national security interests in Europe.  This 
thesis seeks to contribute constructively to the literature on these topics.16 
                                                 
15 Sherr, “Dual Enlargements,” 126. 
16 This thesis deliberately excludes other issues related to Ukraine’s candidacy for NATO 
membership.  For example, if it becomes a NATO ally, Ukraine will probably choose to reduce its 
dependence on Russian manufacturers of military equipment.  Kyiv still exports as much as half of its 
defense industry products to Russia while continuing to receive up to 80% of its military technology and 
hardware from Russia.  Ukraine will probably follow the example of its East European neighbors, which 
conducted effective military reforms, including equipment modernization in conformity with NATO 
standards.  See “Ukraine/NATO:  Kiev’s bid to join presents dilemma,” OxResearch, January 28, 2008, 1. 
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E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis analyzes Russian-Ukrainian energy relations and Russian energy 
relations with NATO Europe.  In studying these two relationships, the thesis seeks to 
understand the ramifications for Ukraine’s NATO candidacy and U.S. security policies 
with reference to NATO, Ukraine and Russia.  In addition to secondary sources, this 
thesis is based on primary sources, including official government statements of NATO 
Allies, Russia, and Ukraine. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is organized as follows.  Chapter II examines Russian-Ukrainian 
energy relations.  Chapter III considers Russian energy relations with NATO Europe.  
Chapter IV focuses on Ukraine’s NATO candidacy.  Chapter V offers conclusions. 
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II. RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN ENERGY RELATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
On 12-13 February 2008 Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko met Russian 
President Vladimir Putin in Moscow and resumed heated discussions on pricing disputes 
concerning Russian and Central Asian natural gas bound for energy-dependent Ukraine.  
President Putin also used the high-profile meeting to send a foreboding message not only 
to Ukraine but also to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), threatening to aim 
Russian missiles at Ukraine if the Alliance were to welcome Kyiv into the collective 
defense pact and subsequently place missile defense bases in the former Soviet 
republic.17 
Russia’s state-controlled natural gas monopoly, Gazprom, did in fact carry 
through on its threats in the seemingly incessant natural gas disagreement, cutting 
supplies to Ukraine by 25% on 3 March 2008 and by an additional 25% the next day in a 
renewed crisis that then lasted several days.  Furthermore, Gazprom accused Ukraine of 
siphoning gas bound for Western and Central Europe.  The incident was reminiscent of 
the January 2006 natural gas crisis between Gazprom and Ukraine which left some 
European consumers without winter gas supplies for four days.18 
Undoubtedly, Ukraine remains geostrategically central to Russian-European 
energy security interdependence.  In fact 80% of all natural gas leaving Russia and 
Central Asia for Western and Central Europe passes through Ukraine, making it the main 
transit state.  Accordingly, Ukraine holds significant geopolitical and economic 
importance to Russia and Western Europe.19 
                                                 
17 “Russia in Ukraine missile threat,” BBC News, February 12, 2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7241470.stm (accessed February 12, 2008). 
18 Claire Bigg, “Gas Crisis Averted, But Underlying Problems Remain,” Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty, March 6, 2008, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2008/3/E080D871-0236-4BAF-B4D1-
7E89F9C87160.html (accessed May 9, 2008). 
19 “Russia Politics:  Belarusian Exposure,” EIU ViewsWire, January 15, 2007, 
http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1210871051&sid=1&Fmt=3&clien
tId=11969&RQT=309&VName=PQD (accessed August 20, 2007). 
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Since taking its momentous path to independence, Ukraine has faced repeated 
challenges to its autonomy.  Russia has effectively exploited the Soviet planners’ system 
of economic interdependence among all the various Soviet regions to manage and even 
manipulate present-day former republics.  In Ukraine’s case Russia has attempted to 
weaken its autonomy through energy dependency.20  More specifically, Russia’s strategy 
pinpoints Ukraine’s energy-intensive economy and its inability to find alternative natural 
gas sources.  Ultimately, dependence on Russia’s energy resources contributes to 
Ukraine’s security dilemma:  choosing between closer political and economic 
cooperation with Russia or a move toward NATO’s collective defense (and ultimately 
greater economic prosperity through the EU). 
B. THE MAGNITUDE OF NATURAL GAS IN RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN TIES 
As a result of its heavy industry and manufacturing economy, Ukraine demands 
energy.  Natural gas constitutes Ukraine’s most critical energy resource, making up 49% 
of Ukraine’s energy consumption.21  In addition, Ukraine expends around 76 billion 
cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas per year.22  This elevated level of gas consumption 
contributes to extremely high energy intensity (energy consumption per unit of GDP).23  
Moreover, notwithstanding a population of only 46 million, in 2006 Ukraine was the 
eighth largest gas consumer in the world according to the Energy Information 
Administration’s estimates.24  Ukraine is the former Soviet Union's largest natural gas net 
importer, and remarkably, “consumes more gas than Poland, the Czech Republic, 
                                                 
20 Abdelal, “Interpreting Interdependence,” 101-102. 
21 “Country Analysis Briefs:  Ukraine,” Energy Information Administration, August 2007, 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Ukraine/Background.html (accessed March 21, 2008). 
22 Ukraine Energy Policy Review 2006 (Paris, France:  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development/International Energy Agency, 2006), 67. 
23 Balmaceda, “Management of Energy Dependency,” 7. 
24 “International Gas Consumption Tables:  Dry Natural Gas Consumption, All Countries, Most 
Recent Annual Estimates, 1980-2006 (Billion Cubic Feet),” Energy Information Administration, May 20, 
2008, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/gasconsumption.html (accessed May 20, 2008).  The 
world’s top eight natural gas consumers are as follows:  the United States, Russia, Iran, Germany, Canada, 
the United Kingdom, Japan, and Ukraine. 
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Hungary, and Slovakia combined.”25  To comparatively illustrate Ukraine’s level of 
energy intensity, Ukraine out-consumes Germany by “over twice as much energy per unit 
of GDP.”26  Moreover, Ukraine’s energy intensity is triple the EU average.27 
Energy is also critical for Russia, the second-largest gas consumer in the world 
(after the United States).28  In contrast to Ukraine, however, Russia is exceptionally 
energy-rich.  Globally, Russia is the second largest oil exporter (after Saudi Arabia), the 
eighth largest owner of proven oil reserves, and the second largest owner of proven coal 
reserves (after the United States).  Most significant to this study, Russia is the world’s 
leading natural gas exporter and holder of the world’s largest proven gas reserves.  
Moreover, Gazprom accounts for 90% of Russia’s gas and owns a quarter of the world’s 
proven reserves.29 
Contrary to frequent Western media and academic analyses that hold that Russia 
employs its energy resources, in particular natural gas, as a foreign policy “weapon,” the 
counterargument, in accordance with the Russia’s 2003 Energy Strategy, emphasizes 
Russia’s aim to eliminate subsidy carry-overs from the Soviet era and charge market 
prices to all its foreign buyers as an impetus to maximize its profits and implement 
economic reforms in accordance with World Trade Organization pledges to the EU.30  
Furthermore, Gazprom, Russia’s primary natural gas negotiator in the international 
market, must increase prices to offset its declining gas outputs and cover costs for 
enhanced production, improved infrastructure and new transport pipelines.31 
Nevertheless, evidence suggests that Russia does maintain and exploit a clear 
advantage in its natural gas relationship with Ukraine.  Strained relations over natural gas 
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supplies are not new and have persisted since the Soviet era.  What brings the current 
Russian-Ukrainian relationship to the forefront is a more politically, economically, and 
militarily intertwined Europe with both NATO and the EU literally rubbing up to 
Ukraine’s borders.  As economic ties abound, between the EU and Russia and the EU and 
Ukraine, including natural gas, the Russian-Ukrainian natural gas tensions receive much 
more attention.  Ukraine’s strong natural gas dependency, along with domestic energy 
inefficiency, non-transparent gas intermediaries, corruption, and divergences among the 
political elites, spells internal turmoil and potential security concerns. 
C. UKRAINE’S NATURAL GAS DEPENDENCY AND LIMITED 
ALTERNATIVES 
When the former Soviet republics took their separate paths of independence in 
1991, “the Ukrainian economy was dependent not just on Russian energy, but on low-
cost Russian energy.”32  Due to its transit status, Kyiv’s national company in charge of 
energy transit, Naftogaz of Ukraine, received $2 billion in 2002 and $1.9 billion in 2003 
for transport of gas and oil to Europe.33  In this respect Ukraine theoretically maintains 
some economic influence with Russia.  Ukraine’s leverage, however, quickly dissipates 
as Gazprom regularly accuses Kyiv of siphoning off gas bound for Europe.34  
Furthermore, Ukraine has incurred a huge gas debt with Russia; regular disputes with 
Gazprom over not only the debt amount but on pricing contracts have worsened relations.  
The most notorious disagreement over gas price subsidies took place in late 2005 and 
early 2006.  Gazprom chose to unexpectedly cut off gas to Ukraine for four days, causing 
much angst in Russia’s West European recipients with disruptions to their gas supplies.35 
D’Anieri has identified three clear-cut rationales of the role of energy in the 
Russian-Ukrainian relationship, thus explaining how dependence affects Ukraine’s 
autonomy.  First, Ukraine has an energy-intensive economy and is thus highly dependent 
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on Russian energy; second, the energy sector demonstrates “the perceived dangers of a 
large degree of economic dependence on Russia.  Third, energy dependency has in fact 
been used by Russia to attempt to persuade Ukraine to give way on a whole range of 
issues.”36 
The energy market’s volatile rules and organization do not afford Ukraine ample 
opportunity to create a system that is conducive to long-term planning or that attracts 
serious investors.  To make matters worse, Ukraine’s government institutions for energy 
perform purely bureaucratic duties, lack research infrastructure, and give way to state 
companies that often cater more to private than to state interests.37  While Ukraine is not 
in a position to optimally diversify its natural gas imports, its institutional shortcomings 
arguably contribute to its energy vulnerability. 
Ukraine has sought to diversify its natural gas alternatives yet often appears 
caught in a vicious circle.  Energy diversification is not a linear process and in fact 
encompasses “energy source diversification, geographical diversification, and contractual 
diversification.”38  At first glance, Turkmenistan would seem to provide the ideal 
alternative.  As Central Asia’s leading gas producer, Turkmenistan is also Ukraine’s 
largest supplier of natural gas.  Ukraine, however, cannot regard Turkmen gas as an 
alternative to Russian gas for two key reasons.  First, Turkmenistan currently runs all of 
its pipelines through Russia.  Second, Gazprom or murkier intermediaries have managed 
the imports from Turkmenistan, creating more corruption than market reform progress.39 
Turkmenistan has become a much tougher negotiator, compelling Gazprom in 
March 2008 to pay “European prices” for gas beginning in 2009.  Currently, Gazprom 
pays Turkmenistan $130 per 1000 cubic meters compared to the $354 per 1000 cubic 
meters it charges European customers.  Ironically, the Gazprom-Turkmen agreement 
coincided with the March 2008 agreement made between Gazprom and Naftogaz of 
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Ukraine which called for Ukraine to pay $179.5 per 1000 cubic meters through 2008.  
Such developments have led to price increases for Ukraine in 2009 and repeated “gas 
wars” between Moscow and Kyiv. 
Unlike oil, natural gas generates “the prohibitively high capital costs of 
constructing and operating new pipelines and developing alternative methods for 
monetizing gas.”40  At present liquefied natural gas (LNG) proves extremely expensive to 
process as well as to ship abroad.  Thus, Ukraine’s natural gas options narrow to Russian 
pipelines.41 
D. AN ENERGY-INTENSIVE ECONOMY AND ECONOMIC 
INTERDEPENDENCE 
While an unavoidable geographic and economic reality, taking a path of 
interdependence with Russia evidently reduces Ukraine’s autonomy.  National cohesion 
presents a constant challenge in Ukraine.  Though no concrete boundaries define the 
social divide, tensions meet along the Dnieper River and at Kyiv, the state’s centrally 
located capital.  The west predominantly draws its social and cultural tendencies from its 
western border, whereas eastern Ukraine’s population includes significant numbers of 
ethnic Russians.  Western Ukraine once formed part of the Polish and Lithuanian 
kingdoms.42  Eastern Ukraine and Crimea were centers of Russian nationalist sentiment 
during the Russian and Soviet empires and maintain large ethnic Russian populations.43 
This east-west divide not affects Ukraine’s politics but also carries over to its 
economic, and hence energy-related, structure.  Ukraine is the eighth largest steel 
producer in the world, and eastern Ukraine’s industrial strength relies on Russian 
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energy.44  Moreover, Russia has successfully played the nationalist hand, maintaining 
positive ties with eastern Ukrainians.  Indeed, Ukraine’s comparative advantage is steel, 
in that Russia imports one-third of Ukraine’s steel production.45  For Gazprom to meet its 
export demands, enhance production, and build ambitious pipelines in the Arctic, it 
requires steel imports.46 
Ukraine’s economic prosperity remains innately linked to that of Russia.  In fact 
“Ukraine has yet to figure out how to protect all of its primary security goals – prosperity, 
autonomy, and sovereignty.”47  As a heavy industry and manufacturing country, 
Ukraine’s dependence on Russia centers on its lack of energy resources, natural gas in 
particular.  
During the Soviet era, natural gas proved vital to Ukraine’s industrial sector, 
ultimately becoming “the single most important resource in the regional economy.”48  
The Soviet Union heavily subsidized gas (and oil) prices, keeping them drastically below 
the world market price.  With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia, with its 
enormous oil and gas reserves, offered to continue subsidized energy prices to the former 
Soviet republics as an economic inducement to align their foreign and economic policies 
with Russia.49 
Throughout communist rule, the Soviet planners successfully created economic 
interdependence among the republics.  Ukraine had been a major coal producer, but 
Russian and Central Asian oil and gas were so inexpensive that Ukraine’s coal industry 
atrophied.  Ukraine’s energy-intensive economy based on heavy industry and 
                                                 
44 “Steel Map of Ukraine,” The Ukrainian Association of Ferrous Metallurgy Enterprises, 
http://www.ukrfer.org.ua/Map_eng.php (accessed March 18, 2008). 
45 Vladimir Socor, “Ukrainian Steel Exports Face Hurdles on the Russian Market,” Eurasia Daily 
Monitor 2:16 (January 24, 2005).  http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2369141 
(accessed May 12, 2008). 
46 Andrew E. Kramer, “As Gazprom’s chairman moves up, so does Russia’s most powerful 
company,” International Herald Tribune, May 11, 2008, 
http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/05/11/business/11gaz.php?page=2 (accessed May 11, 2008). 
47 D’Anieri, Economic Interdependence, 200. 
48 Abdelal, “Interpreting Interdependence,” 104-105. 
49 Stulberg, Well-Oiled Diplomacy, 14. 
 18
manufacturing received some of the most beneficial oil and gas subsidies – with prices 
much lower than those in the global market – during the Soviet era.  In essence, the 
Soviet planners created an institutionally energy-dependent Ukraine.50  Soviet-era 
dependency has translated into a profound contemporary Russian-Ukrainian energy 
relationship. 
Ukraine exacerbates its energy dependency by continued domestic subsidies on 
natural gas prices, thus perpetuating its energy inefficiency.  Due to subsidies, industries 
and the public have no motive to adhere to prudent practices of energy conservation.51  In 
addition, Ukraine faces inflation problems.  Though negligible in comparison to inflation 
woes in the 1990s, Ukraine’s inflation problem, which surpassed 26% year-on-year in 
March 2008, constitutes its biggest economic concern.52  Government officials claim that 
the increase in gas prices significantly contributes to the problem.  Gazprom has raised 
gas prices in the latest agreement in March 2008 with Ukraine “to $179.5 per 1000 cubic 
metres – 40% cheaper than global prices of $250 per unit but a lot higher than the $70 it 
paid two years ago.” 53 Inflation and price increases compound the problems associated 
with the Ukrainian government’s continued policy of subsidized energy prices for the 
population.  The energy industry invites corruption; and this is another battle Ukraine 
must face in the energy sphere. 
Ukraine’s quandary may lead to closer cooperation with Russia to try to retain 
low gas prices.  With low gas prices, however, Ukraine remains in an inflationary bind 
and thus looks less appealing to the EU as a potential member.  Closer ties between 
Russia and Ukraine could obviously make NATO members less apt to bring Ukraine into 
the Alliance. 
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To curb dependence on Russia and promote greater economic diversity, Ukraine 
continues to increase its participation in international institutions.  On 5 February 2008 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) invited Ukraine to join following fifteen years of 
negotiations.  President Yushchenko envisions economic progress in Ukraine’s 
metallurgy production – a move toward potentially greater economic diversity – through 
the WTO.54  Ukraine’s Parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, ratified the WTO accession 
agreement on 10 April 2008 with the endorsement by 411 of 450 Members of Parliament 
(MP).55 
In what was perhaps an attempt to defuse tensions with Russia (the world’s single 
major economy that is not a WTO member) Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko stated, 
ironically at a joint press-conference with the President of the European Commission, 
José Manuel Barroso, in Brussels, that Ukraine’s WTO membership “will not serve as an 
instrument of putting pressure on the other countries, first of all, Russia, which concerns 
the issues of economic cooperation, particularly in [the] gas sphere.”56  In due course, 
Ukraine’s WTO accession may foster greater transparency and economic reform, thus 
reducing its foreign debt and its energy debt to Gazprom in particular. 
E. THE GEOPOLITICS OF UKRAINE’S ENERGY SECURITY 
Ukraine has treated its energy dependent relationship with Russia as a security 
issue and even a considerable security threat.  Ukraine’s interpretation not only affects its 
political and economic relations with Russia but also its rapprochement to NATO and the 
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European Union.  Furthermore, as Ukraine has enhanced its autonomy since its 1991 
declaration of independence, it has pursued greater and more balanced economic 
opportunities with both the EU and Russia.  In fact, despite Ukraine’s domestic east-west 
political divide, the European Union has constituted Ukraine’s largest trading partner 
over the last six years.  The EU has imported 25.6% of Ukraine’s total exports while 
Russia, Ukraine’s second leading trade partner, has received 21.3% of Ukraine’s goods.57  
In addition, as of 2007, Germany leads all foreign investors with 23.5% of Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) in Ukraine.  As the seventh leading foreign investor at 5.1%, Russia has 
dropped far behind.58 
Regardless of the mutual benefits of increased trade among all parties, Russia’s 
political ambitions present challenges to Ukraine’s autonomy.  As is discussed in the 
following chapter, with Russia’s ambitious projects with the European Union as well as 
its lucrative bilateral deals with France, Germany, and Italy, Ukraine faces greater 
difficulties in tackling its energy security issues.  Russia comprehends Ukraine’s 
dilemma. By achieving greater natural gas interdependence with NATO Europe, Moscow 
may hope to prevent NATO’s acceptance of an energy-dependent Ukraine. 
1. Natural Gas Negotiations versus The Black Sea Fleet and Nuclear 
Weapons 
With respect to Moscow’s attempts to exploit the Russian-Ukrainian energy 
relationship, former Ukrainian Prime Minister Anatoli Kinakh once emphatically stated, 
“We will never be paying our energy debts with shares of our companies.”59  In essence 
the former prime minister’s statement divulges the tumultuous nature of the Russian-
Ukrainian natural gas relationship.  Kyiv has skeptically and cautiously proceeded in its 
deals with Russia and Gazprom.  In the early stages of post-communist independence, 
Russia attempted to reduce Ukraine’s autonomy and even threatened it. 
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During the “energy war” with Ukraine in 1993-1994, Russian behavior suggested 
that Moscow thought that if it threatened Ukraine’s economic prosperity and fragile 
advancement as a newly independent state, it could retain a political hold on Ukraine.  
The Russian strategy played out in September 1993 at the Massandra Summit in the Yalta 
region of Crimea.  Russian and Ukrainian officials organized the summit to resolve two 
critical issues – the future status of the Black Sea Fleet and Ukraine’s nuclear 
disarmament.60  Foreshadowing contemporary gas disputes, “A week before the summit, 
Gazprom cut its supply of gas to Ukraine by 25 percent, citing Ukrainian non-payment as 
the reason.  At Massandra, Russian negotiators caught the Ukrainian delegation off guard 
by proposing a cancellation of Ukrainian gas debt in return for full control of the Black 
Sea Fleet and the surrender of Ukraine’s nuclear warheads.  If Ukraine did not agree, the 
Russians said, gas supplies would be halted.”61 
Ultimately, due to domestic resentment of “selling” Ukrainian interests, including 
the Black Sea Fleet, to Russia, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk withdrew his 
acceptance of Russia’s coercive economic diplomacy.  Taking a nationalist stance 
certainly preserved Ukraine’s autonomy in the short-term but quickly damaged its 
economy as half of Kyiv’s industrial firms had to close by October 1993.62 
The 1993 turbulence clearly demonstrates that the 2006 and 2008 episodes simply 
represent “more of the same” in the Russian-Ukrainian gas relationship.  This pattern of 
turbulent negotiations particularly reflects present-day troubles not only for Ukraine’s 
dependence on Russian gas but also for the wariness with which Europe should proceed 
in its natural gas relations with Russia.  Understandably, with the majority of its natural 
gas supplies passing through Ukraine, NATO Europe has chosen to exercise some 
caution in its relations with both Russia and Ukraine. 
Indeed, Ukraine effectively handled nuclear disarmament through a multilateral 
process.  As the issue of ensuring the security of nuclear weapons in the post-Soviet 
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space attracted attention from NATO, Russia’s call for Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament 
prior to the Massandra Summit was not bilaterally resolved.  NATO’s nuclear powers, 
i.e., France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, all displayed heightened interest 
in the status of Ukraine’s nuclear weapons.  Russia, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States signed the December 1994 Memorandum on Security Assurances 
associated with Ukraine’s accession to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as a non-
nuclear-weapon state.  The memorandum further called for the assurance of a sovereign 
and independent Ukraine; and significant to this study, the 1994 document guaranteed 
Ukraine’s protection from economic coercion.63 
Conversely, the naval forces disagreement between Russia and Ukraine 
predictably resurfaced.  For Russia, the Black Sea Fleet has historically represented not 
only military but national prestige.  To hand over the fleet to Ukraine could not only 
provoke an outburst of Russian nationalism but also irritate the mostly ethnic Russian 
inhabitants of Crimea, home to the Black Sea Fleet in the port city of Sevastopol.  Ethnic 
Russians make up more than 70% of the autonomous Republic of Crimea’s population 
and until 1954 Crimea formed a part of “modern” Russia.64  The Soviet Union presented 
Crimea as a gift to Ukraine in celebration of 300 years of Russian rule of Ukraine.65 
In 1997 Russia and Ukraine signed the notable Black Sea Fleet accords, which 
effectively advanced the bilateral relationship.  Ukraine legally secured Crimea as part of 
its sovereign territory, despite Russia’s previous desires for control. 66  Nonetheless, the 
accords included certain provisions that remain in place today.  The lease agreement 
allowed Russia to maintain its Black Sea Fleet in Ukrainian ports for twenty years (until 
2017) with an option for a five-year extension.67  Ukraine must consequently share 
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basing privileges. Russia arguably got the better end of the deal with the deeper draft 
ports.  Reportedly, Russia eventually plans to move its fleet to Novorossiysk (on Russia’s 
Black Sea littoral).68 
Lastly, Ukraine’s energy debt conspicuously enters the equation.  According to 
the agreement, Russia resumed payments for basing its fleet in Sevastopol.  Rather than 
pay Ukraine directly for its base leasing, Russia insisted that Kyiv re-funnel the funds 
back to Moscow to cover its energy debts.69  Russia has thus managed to exploit 
Ukraine’s natural gas dependency to make Kyiv concede on major issues. 
Though natural gas prices, debts, and agreements did contribute to the Black Sea 
Accords, 2017 is certainly too far off to make accurate predictions on whether natural gas 
supplies will play a role in future negotiations on the status of the Black Sea Fleet.  
Indeed, the current trend of Gazprom to move the Russian-Ukrainian gas relationship 
toward market prices would indicate that energy will not play a role in the future of the 
Black Sea Accords.  Even so, Russia must make a concerted effort to remove subsidies 
from its domestic gas market to allow for economic reforms, which through internal 
improvements may in turn soften its confrontational position with Ukraine.  Likewise, its 
interest in maintaining sovereignty over Sevastopol and the rest of Crimea should 
encourage Ukraine to adhere to a disciplined energy policy, to conform to market prices 
and to enhance its energy efficiency.  Moreover, serving as a more reliable economic 
partner to Russia and NATO Europe will lead to better relations as a gas transit state. 
2. Pipeline Policies 
Though disadvantaged by its dependency on natural gas imports from and through 
Russia, Ukraine’s role as the principal transit state of Russian natural gas to Europe 
offsets to some extent Russia’s upper hand in the relationship.  Ukraine has not 
cooperated with Gazprom’s strategy to acquire control of pipelines transiting its territory 
to European markets.  Gazprom has thus enjoyed limited success in achieving its 
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strategy.  Among its Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) customers, only 
Armenia and Moldova have acquiesced on joint ventures that give Gazprom control of 
45% and 50% of their pipelines, respectively.70 
Strategically critical to the energy relationship between Russia and Europe, 
Ukraine serves as the principal natural gas transit state, with 80% of Russian gas passing 
through its pipelines to Western and Central Europe.  Gazprom has succeeded, however, 
in building alternative routes.  In the mid-1990s, Gazprom built the Yamal pipeline 
through Belarus and Poland that does not cross Ukrainian soil.71  As is discussed in the 
following chapter, Gazprom has signed new contracts with Germany and Italy to build 
gas pipelines from Russia to Europe.  Neither plan, however, goes through Ukraine. 
F. CONCLUSION 
The Russian-Ukrainian natural gas relationship has greatly evolved since the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union.  While developing greater political and economic ties 
with its European neighbors to the west, Ukraine has strived to safeguard its sovereignty 
and strengthen its autonomy.  Meanwhile, Russia has regained international prestige, 
building an economic base from its oil and gas industry and enhancing its own significant 
economic ties with Western Europe. 
A major turning point occurred, however, when President Leonid Kuchma backed 
Russia’s proposed Single Economic Space (SES).  Russia has sought to marshal former 
Soviet republics in a common economic zone to enhance political and economic ties.  
Kuchma thought that in supporting the SES, Russia would support his selected candidate 
for the 2004 presidential elections.  In the energy field, the SES was to allow greater 
Russian management of Ukraine’s pipelines to Europe.  Accordingly, Russia was “to 
abandon the idea of building new pipelines around Ukraine.”72 The flawed 2004 elections 
ignited the Orange Revolution’s call for greater democratic governance.  With the 
Western-oriented Viktor Yushchenko claiming victory, the energy relationship has gone 
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the way of the two countries.  Gazprom has carried out gas cutoffs to Ukraine while 
Ukraine has failed to make payments or readily agree to price increases.  Furthermore, 
Ukraine has chosen not to sign on to the SES and has rejected Gazprom’s desire to 
control the pipelines in Ukraine.  Lastly, Russia has made concerted efforts to build new 
pipelines around Ukraine.  Hence, the more both countries turn to Western Europe, the 
less importance they attribute to bilateral cooperation.  What remains to be determined is 
what direction NATO Europe will take. 
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III. RUSSIAN ENERGY RELATIONS WITH NATO EUROPE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In his momentous speech at the Munich Conference on Security Policy in 2007, 
Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasized the critical nature of Russian-Ukrainian 
energy relations in the context of European energy security: 
For fifteen years prior to 2006 … deliveries of Russian energy and, first 
and foremost, of gas to Europe depended on the conditions and prices for 
the deliveries of Russian gas to Ukraine itself.  And this was something 
that Ukraine and Russia agreed among themselves.  And if we reached no 
agreement, then all European consumers would sit there with no gas…  
We signed separate contracts for the delivery of our gas to Ukraine and for 
delivering Russian gas to Europe for the next five years.  You should 
thank us, both Russia and Ukraine, for this decision.73 
Putin evidently wished to conjure up an image of a Russian-Ukrainian “tandem” 
ensuring consistent natural gas supplies to Europe.  In reality, Russia and certain states in 
Western Europe have made palpable efforts to distance themselves from Ukraine as the 
principal transit state while establishing greater economic ties through the energy 
industry. 
Russia’s impressive economic ascent stems largely from windfall oil and gas 
profits since 2001.  In December 1998 the market price for world crude oil was 
approximately $10 a barrel, but by September 2000 the price had climbed to $33 a 
barrel.74  Devaluation of the ruble after the 1998 economic crash induced low labor and 
capital input costs, allowing Russia to capitalize on the soaring prices without even 
increasing production.75  While Russia has initiated few structural improvements to its 
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economy, its fiscal success derives largely from “a combination of high energy prices, oil 
and gas production growth rates, rising energy export volumes, and associated revenues” 
since 2001.76 
Russia’s predominant commodity export has traditionally been petroleum; 
however, natural gas has become increasingly popular, particularly in the West European 
market.  Gazprom controls one quarter of proven world gas reserves.77  The EU receives 
one quarter of its gas supply from Russia, the largest amount from any supplier; forecasts 
suggest that EU dependency on Russian gas may grow to 50% by 2030.78  In fact, Russia 
has concluded several recent agreements with not only West European companies but 
also non-European suppliers of natural gas to Europe in order to implement its “security 
of demand” energy policy. 
B. RUSSIA’S CIRCUMFERENTIAL GAS APPROACH TO EUROPE 
Russia’s strategy of utilizing its energy resources to reassert its political and 
economic influence is reminiscent of the famous adage, “all roads lead to Rome.”  In 
Russia’s case, all pipelines to Europe flow from Russia.  Though embellished, this claim 
is metaphorically not far from the truth; Gazprom has relentlessly sought to expand 
cooperation with Norway and other leading energy suppliers to Europe.  Gazprom has 
concluded deals with African energy powerhouses such as Algeria, Libya, and Nigeria, 
endowing Russia with even greater control of gas pipelines into Europe.  In fact, a 
Gazprom spokeswoman emphasized, “Africa is one of Gazprom’s priorities, as the 
company made a decision to go global in terms of acquiring assets and developing 
strategy outside Russia.”79  
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On 17 April 2008, for example, Putin traveled to Libya to sign a major energy 
agreement with Colonel Muammer Gaddafi.  Putin’s landmark visit to Libya, the first by 
a Russian leader since 1985, extended Russia’s reach to North Africa.  In essence, Putin 
erased Tripoli’s $4.5 billion debt, which had accumulated from Cold War-era 
procurements of Soviet weapons, in exchange for multibillion dollar joint ventures with 
Russian state-owned companies, most significantly between Gazprom and Libya’s state-
owned energy company, National Oil Corporation of Libya, to jointly “explore for, 
produce, transport and sell oil and gas.”80 
Ultimately, Russia’s stratagem with Libya ties into the European energy market.  
Alexey Miller, Gazprom’s chief executive, who traveled with Putin to Tripoli, asserted 
that Gazprom aspires to work with the Italian energy leviathan, Ente Nazionale 
Idrocarburi (Eni), the principal foreign energy company in Libya, in constructing a new 
pipeline from Libya to Sicily.81  Miller’s timely proposal comes after Eni extended its 
contract with Libya in October 2007 for another twenty-five years with plans to double 
Libyan natural gas deliveries to Europe with the expected pipeline.82 
In addition, Gazprom has set its sights on Nigeria.  As of January 2008, Gazprom 
and Nigerian officials have been involved in negotiations toward a $2.5 billion deal to 
increase Nigeria’s natural gas potential, including exporting gas to Europe via the Trans-
Saharan Gas Pipeline through Algeria to the Mediterranean coast.  Moreover, Nigeria 
prefers to work with “non-Western” companies to advance its natural gas industry, 
further playing into Russia’s hands.83  Indeed, Gazprom has positively influenced 
Nigerian energy officials, leading one to declare, “What Gazprom is proposing is mind-
boggling.  They’re talking tough and saying the West has taken advantage of us in the 
last 50 years and they’re offering us a better deal.”84 
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Ironically, Gazprom, which possesses no LNG production capacity, may hope to 
gain proficiency through an agreement with Nigeria.85  Gaining such proficiency would 
enhance Gazprom’s upstream capacity for LNG production and shipping from its gas 
fields in proximity to the Baltic Sea, the Barents Sea, Sakhalin Island, and the Arctic.86 
Algeria, as of 2004 the third largest exporter of natural gas to Europe after 
Norway and Russia, opened discussions between its state-owned energy company, 
Sonatrach, and Gazprom in 2006; but these firms have not yet come to any agreement.87  
Both Nigeria and Algeria stand out as critical to Europe, as the EU has proposed a 
“2,700-mile pipeline linking the Niger Delta to existing gas transmission hubs” from 
Algeria to Europe.88 
Lastly, in 2005 Gazprom continued ties with Norway’s major energy company, 
Statoil, to work more closely on LNG production, including supplies to the United 
States.89  Gazprom has not greatly advanced ties with Norway since 2005, instead 
increasing cooperation with other West European energy companies. 
Indeed, Russia’s energy advances with external energy providers, in Africa in 
particular, have caused concern in the EU.  Gazprom’s tireless efforts prompted Igor 
Tomberg, an energy expert at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations 
in Moscow, to observe:  “Europe is sleeping as Gazprom makes every effort to become a 
global player and increase its grip on Europe…  By diversifying its supplies and gaining 
even more access to European markets, geopolitically, it is surrounding Europe.”90  This 
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concern has not translated into any coherent and coordinated EU energy strategy, as West 
European energy companies have advantageously pursued bilateral deals with Gazprom 
that benefit their domestic gas suppliers and even convert them into transit mechanisms 
to other West European states.  These innovative ventures systematically circumvent 
Ukraine as well as other transit states, such as Belarus and Poland. 
Russia and its instrument Gazprom relentlessly pursue greater economic 
opportunities in the enormous hydrocarbon commodity market.  In an unmistakable game 
of geopolitics, Russia has found its niche in the energy trade while clearly ensuring its 
influence over – or control of – pipelines into Western and Central Europe.  Furthermore, 
Russia has informally proposed the idea of a natural gas cartel to several gas suppliers to 
Europe.  Gazprom envisions a cartel that would operate much like OPEC to control 
global natural gas prices; Iran and Libya support the proposal while Algeria and Qatar 
have not yet pledged support.91 
In essence, while the member states of the European Union struggle to reach a 
consensus on a common energy policy, Russia has unilaterally and vigorously sought to 
influence Europe’s energy market.  Though not an orthodox approach to capitalism, 
Russia’s energy ventures have thus far succeeded in striking bilateral agreements with 
some states, while in effect leading the disadvantaged, e.g., Poland and the Baltic states, 
to clamor vociferously in the EU for a consensus energy policy.  Consequently, Gazprom 
instrumentally serves as the model for Russia’s modern business plan.92  In a free market 
economy and during an era of globalization, Putin holds, Russian companies should 
intrinsically represent the state; hence, Putin’s move to renationalize much of Russia’s 
energy sector.  Russia needs Western investment, technology, and capital to improve 
Gazprom’s production levels, jumpstart LNG production capacity, and finance 
exploration and expansion of its natural gas reserves in the Arctic.  Russia’s thinking 
reflects “the Soviet economic model, with an emphasis on gigantism and economies of 
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scale and faith in the pricing power of monopolies.”93  State capitalism has thus far 
succeeded in sparking Russia’s resurgent economy.  In fact, Putin capably allocated $144 
billion toward an energy stabilization fund from surplus oil and gas revenues as well as 
accumulating nearly $480 billion in foreign currency reserves.94 
Nevertheless, the state of the economy is sharply linked to (a) the productivity of 
Russia’s energy companies and their ability to meet the demands of European customers 
and (b) continued high global energy prices.  These current high oil and gas prices help to 
explain Putin’s move to enhance state control of the oil industry.  Moreover, the economy 
has become exceedingly reliant on oil and gas revenues as a percentage of GDP, jumping 
“from 12.7% in 1999 to 31.6% in 2007.”95  Ultimately, Russia requires energy sales to 
sustain economic growth.  Gazprom’s joint ventures with European energy giants are 
intended to ensure continued sales as well as the lead in European energy markets.  The 
fact that Europe lacks a common voice with respect to energy greatly assuages Russian 
concerns and may even translate into greater political strength with Russia’s neighbors, 
specifically Ukraine. 
C. NO “UNION” IN THE EU’S ENERGY POLICY 
Russia’s energy exports to Europe, natural gas in particular, are highly significant.  
In fact, the European Union imports 46% of its natural gas from Russia; as previously 
stated, 80% of these Russian gas supplies pass through Ukraine.  Norway and Algeria are 
the other key sources, supplying the EU with 27% and 20%, respectively.96  It is Russia 
that causes the greatest juxtaposition of collective consternation and self-interested 
national collusion among EU members, which take divergent, and to some extent, 
contradictory, paths in their energy relationships with Russia.  Admittedly, the EU has 
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never formulated and pursued a cohesive energy security strategy.  Member countries 
have simply carried out exclusive policies based on their individual interests and needs; 
hence, Brussels has not recognized any requirement for a common EU energy policy. 
The dynamics in Brussels have greatly altered, however, since EU enlargement 
ushered in former Warsaw Pact countries, as well as the ex-Soviet Baltic states.  These 
countries bring to Brussels historical relations with Russia starkly different from those of 
their West European neighbors.  These differences resonate equally within NATO.  These 
new member states of the EU and NATO have helped to mold a more vigilant approach 
to Russian energy, arguably bringing Europe closer together. 
Conversely, these states, Poland and Lithuania in particular, have actively 
promoted caution on accords designed to foster greater interaction with Russia.97  The 
primary vehicle has been the Partnership and Co-operation Agreements (PCA), which the 
EU has developed with East European and Central Asian states as “legal frameworks, 
based on the respect of democratic principles and human rights, setting out the political, 
economic and trade relationship between the EU and its partner countries.  Each PCA is a 
ten-year bilateral treaty signed and ratified by the EU and the individual state.”98  The 
PCA is the overarching collaborative agreement between the EU and Russia.  Russia and 
the EU signed their first PCA in 1997 but have failed to renew the treaty.99  
Disagreements over renewing the PCA demonstrate the infighting among EU members 
regarding not only a common energy policy with Russia but also a unified political 
strategy. 
An obsolete PCA leaves the EU two remaining alternatives to interface with 
Russia on energy relations:  the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) and the EU-Russia Energy 
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Dialogue.100  The ECT evolved from an EU declaration in 1991 to a treaty in 1994 and 
entered into legal force in 1998.101  The EU utilizes the ECT to standardize energy 
regulations and agreements and to foster greater international collaboration on energy 
relations.102  The ECT has drawn its legal foundations from the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and subsequently its successor, the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), for the purpose of greater adherence to free market principles and evenhanded 
competition.103  In essence, the ECT calls for the liberalization of trade and investment 
and guarantees each member state autonomy in its decision-making about energy 
resources.  The ECT does not obligate member states to privatize their energy sectors.104 
EU member states have been major proponents of the ECT in order to establish 
and sustain a multilateral approach to energy security.  In 1991 Dutch Prime Minister 
Ruud Lubbers proposed a “European Energy Community” at a European Council 
meeting in Dublin.105  By design, the EU, one of the major proponents of the ECT, 
intended to employ the treaty to enhance cooperation with the former Soviet republics 
and establish a multilateral legal and economic foundation for a sustainable energy 
security policy.106 
To Europe’s dismay, Russia has signed but has not ratified the ECT.  Gazprom 
does not perceive any incentive to adhere to the ECT’s “Protocol on Transit,” which 
would break up Gazprom’s near monopoly on natural gas pipelines in Central Asia and 
the post-Soviet space adjacent to Europe.107  Moreover, Russia has no reason to conform 
 
                                                 
100 Paul Belkin, The European Union’s Energy Security Challenges, Congressional Research Service 
Report for Congress, RL33636, January 30, 2008, 12. 
101 See the Energy Charter website for details:  http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=7 (accessed 
May 28, 2008). 
102 Belkin, Energy Security Challenges, 3. 
103 Pami Aalto and Kirsten Westphal, “Introduction,” in The EU-Russian Energy Dialogue:  Europe’s 
Future Energy Security, ed. Pami Aalto, 11 (Burlington, VT:  Ashgate Publishing Company, 2008). 
104 Ibid., 12. 
105 Energy Charter:  http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=7 (accessed May 28, 2008).  
106 Ibid. 
107 Aalto and Westphal, “Introduction,” 12. 
 35
to the ECT as long as it is not a WTO member.  Hence, rather than anticipate Russia’s 
ratification of the ECT, the EU has sought a more direct approach to Russia through the 
EU-Russia Energy Dialogue. 
In October 2000 in Paris, during the sixth energy summit between the EU and 
Russia, the two sides decided to form an enhanced strategic energy partnership.  Thus, 
the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue was established to “provide an opportunity to raise all 
the questions of common interest relating to the [energy] sector, including the 
introduction of co-operation on energy saving, rationalisation of production and transport 
infrastructures, European investment possibilities, and relations between producer and 
consumer countries.  The planned ratification of the Energy Charter Treaty by Russia and 
the improvement of the investment climate will be important aspects.”108  The EU 
envisioned the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue as the primary interface to capitalize on its 
interdependent energy relationship in hope of Russia’s ratification of the ECT.  Though 
the Dialogue has been useful in creating better energy trade opportunities, the EU has not 
succeeded in defining a collective and effective energy policy or in bringing about 
Russia’s ratification of the ECT.109 
In January 2007 the European Commission expressed optimism about making 
progress toward an all-encompassing energy policy and sent a communication to the 
European Council and the European Parliament entitled, “An Energy Policy for 
Europe.”110  Moreover, the EU highlighted the importance of a common energy policy at 
its March 2007 summit.111 EU member states concur that they face a growing problem of 
dependence on Russian energy suppliers, and they intend to strengthen their energy 
security.  Nevertheless, the ECT, the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, and the earnest 
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attempt to define a consensual energy policy have not overshadowed the continued 
bilateral energy deals between individual EU members and Gazprom. 
D. POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF BILATERAL ENERGY DEALS WITH 
GAZPROM 
1. Germany 
Germany’s strategic partnership with Russia has manifestly developed through 
increased energy ties.  In fact, according to the Brookings Institution, “Germany has been 
Russia’s closest Western energy partner since the 1970s.”112  In September 2005 German 
companies BASF/Wintershall AG and E.ON Ruhrgas AG signed an agreement with 
Gazprom to construct a pipeline, Nord Stream, directly from Portovaya Bay, near the 
Russian border with Finland, to Greifswald, Germany.113  The pipeline will run along the 
Baltic Sea, and most prominently, will not transit any other East European state.  
Moscow prefers to deliver as directly as possible to the countries that it deems reliable 
business partners, such as Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United 
Kingdom.114  Thus, Russia avoids having to deal with tenuous political relations by 
overtly bypassing its historic “sphere of influence,” including former Soviet satellite 
states, while fulfilling Western Europe’s energy “security of supply” policy and 
increasing Western Europe’s dependence on Russian natural gas. 
Nord Stream’s success hinges on Europe’s energy demand.  The Kremlin and 
Gazprom have adeptly rallied political support in Western Europe for the ambitious 
project.  Gerhard Schröder, the former German chancellor, not only endorsed the joint 
Russian-German venture toward the end of his term in office; he also accepted Putin’s 
offer to lead the Nord Stream consortium.115 
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Nevertheless, Nord Stream must surmount numerous obstacles before starting to 
lay the pipeline under the Baltic Sea.  No country bordering the Baltic Sea along the 
projected pipeline’s path has provided the required construction permits to the Nord 
Stream consortium to build under the sea in its territorial waters.  The list of bordering 
countries includes Nord Stream’s potential West European recipients (Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, and Sweden) and those opposed to Nord Stream (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
and Poland).116  Major setbacks have beset Nord Stream, including Sweden’s 
environmental concerns, Denmark’s and Poland’s boundary discords, and Estonia’s 
refusal to allow the pipeline to pass through its territorial waters.  These setbacks have 
increased negative perceptions of the project, while projected costs have climbed from $7 
billion to more than $11.5 billion.117 
Currently, Russian natural gas makes up only 43% of German domestic 
consumption.118  That figure, however, is expected to rise over the next several years, 
especially if Nord Stream comes on line, making Germany an even greater consumer, and 
indisputably a major transit state as well.  The increasingly close relations between 
Russia and Germany transcend energy, yet the energy sector emblematically defines a 
budding strategic partnership.  Moreover, contemporary German-Russian relations stand 
in contrast with current trends in Russian-Ukrainian relations, and tend to magnify 
tensions between the two former Soviet republics. 
2. Italy 
Italy’s leading energy company, Eni, in which the state holds about 30 percent, 
has considerably advanced its bilateral ties with Gazprom.  In addition to possible 
cooperation on pipeline plans in Libya, Eni and Gazprom have agreed to asset swaps.  
Thus, Eni has access to “the production, or upstream, business in Russia, a rare privilege 
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for a foreign company, in return for Gazprom’s entering the downstream, or retailing, 
distribution and transportation network in Italy.”119 
Most significantly, and in parallel with the Russian-German energy relationship, 
Eni signed a memorandum of understanding in June 2007 to construct the South Stream 
pipeline, providing southern Europe with a new Russian supply line.  Russia plans to 
extend this pipeline from Russia under the Black Sea to Bulgaria.  It will then separate in 
two directions.  The northern line will proceed to Romania and Hungary, while the 
southern line will traverse the Balkans and Greece en route to Italy and potentially further 
West European destinations.120  At the signing of the agreement between Gazprom and 
Eni, Italy's Minister for Economic Development, Pierluigi Bersani, announced, “The 
South Stream project aims at strengthening Europe's energy security. The agreement 
signed today once again testifies to the strength of the strategic partnership between Italy 
and the Russian Federation that will support the cooperation between the European Union 
and Russia.”121 
Evidently all states involved in South Stream have likewise formed bilateral ties 
with Gazprom.  In April 2008 Gazprom invited Romano Prodi, a former Italian Prime 
Minister and a former President of the European Commission, to head South Stream, but 
Prodi declined Gazprom’s offer.122  In any case, Russia’s move demonstrates its desire to 
achieve political backing for its energy ventures in Europe.  Moscow probably sees 
political support based on energy interdependence as (a) potential backing with respect to 
such contentious issues as NATO enlargement and missile defense, as well as (b) 
potential understanding from the EU with regard to Moscow’s increasingly tempestuous 
relations with Kyiv and Tbilisi. 
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South Stream is undoubtedly controversial for two reasons.  First, as with Nord 
Stream, Gazprom has clearly designed a pipeline to circumvent Ukraine.  Second, South 
Stream is conspicuously the chief competitor of Nabucco, the proposed pipeline to supply 
gas from the Caspian Sea basin to Europe.123  Both the EU and the United States back 
Nabucco as it is configured to counter Gazprom’s monopoly of gas pipelines from Russia 
and Central Asia into Europe.  In fact, Nabucco came to the forefront of the EU’s energy 
plans following the January 2006 natural gas dispute between Russia and Ukraine.  In 
essence, Nabucco would run from Caspian states rich in gas, primarily Turkmenistan, as 
well as Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan.124  Nevertheless, though the EU energy commission 
has sponsored Nabucco, the ambitious Nord and South Stream bilateral projects with 
Russia may take precedence.125  Compounding the situation, Turkey, a probable Nabucco 
transit state from the Caspian to Europe, has bargained with the EU for considerable 
control over the pipeline.  Paradoxically, using its leverage as an EU outsider, Ankara has 
sought to receive reduced domestic prices for Nabucco gas and charge transit fees to the 
EU.126  Nabucco is therefore tending to fracture solidarity among NATO and EU 
member states. 
3. France 
Following these major developments with Germany and Italy, in July 2007 
Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a major energy deal with French President 
Nicolas Sarkozy for France’s Total, the world’s fourth largest oil and gas company, to 
exploit offshore gas fields in the Russian Arctic.  The so-called Shtokman project is 
worth $20 billion and possesses enough proven gas reserves to meet the world’s natural 
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gas requirements for an entire year.127  Thus, France has also entered into a strategic 
energy partnership with Russia that mirrors increasingly close political and economic 
Russian-French relations. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The EU’s inability to renew the PCA with Russia has heightened tensions among 
EU member states.  In November 2005 Warsaw blocked a new PCA with Russia over 
Moscow’s ban on Polish meat exports; Poland dropped its objection when Russia lifted 
the embargo in December 2007.128  On 29 April 2008 the EU foreign ministers’ 
negotiations came to an impasse when Lithuania vetoed the PCA.129  Vilnius had 
contended that the EU should incorporate tougher language in the accord due to Russia’s 
questionable democratic practices and harsh stance with its neighbors.  Lithuania has 
been particularly concerned about its oil supplies from Russia as well as the severe strains 
between Moscow and Tbilisi regarding the so-called frozen conflicts in Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia.130  On 26 May 2008 the EU eliminated the gridlock over the renewed 
PCA with Moscow by assuring Vilnius that its apprehensions would be discussed at the 
summit scheduled for 26-27 June 2008 in Siberia.131  
The energy debate has revealed fractious internal divides in the European Union.  
The wrangling in Brussels has permitted states seeking more comprehensive deals with 
Russia and Gazprom to justify their actions.  In fact, Italy reportedly “made a barely 
veiled threat along these lines,” in view of the EU’s standstill on the Russia PCA in April 
2008.132  The Economist reported that “Greece chose the same day formally to sign up to 
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South Stream, a Kremlin-backed Black Sea pipeline that many see as a direct rival to the 
EU’s own [Nabucco] plans in the region.”133 
Due to the complexity of the energy sector and the multitude of institutional and 
legal frameworks, bilateral approaches with Russia appear to be preferred by most 
European governments.  German Chancellor Angela Merkel, as the first Western leader 
to personally congratulate Russian president-elect Dmitry Medvedev in Moscow (just six 
days following the Russian presidential elections on 2 March 2008), concisely declared, 
“Germany and Russia, Europe and Russia, are interdependent. We must find a way to go 
forward together. There are many things to do.”134  Although Europe and Russia 
maintain an interdependent energy relationship, political rhetoric can quickly revert to 
past tensions amid future worries.  At the very same press conference with Chancellor 
Merkel, Putin expressed his deep concern over NATO:  “You get the impression that 
attempts are being made to set up an organisation that would substitute for the UN…  [If 
that occurred,] the potential for conflict would only increase."135  In spite of significant 
economic advances, primarily via the energy sphere, Russia remains overtly concerned 
over the prospect of NATO’s further enlargement in the post-Soviet space.  Apparently 
neither an enhanced PCA with the EU, nor the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, nor 
blockbuster bilateral energy deals with the larger countries of NATO Europe will quell 
Moscow’s anxieties about NATO’s potential enlargement on its various borders, above 
all with Ukraine.  Moscow’s critical reaction to the NATO enlargement process 
represents one of the major obstacles to Kyiv’s accession to NATO, notably in the 
context of Russian-European energy relations. 
                                                 
133 “Divide, rule or waffle,” The Economist, 59-60. 
134 “‘No Russian thaw under Medvedev’,” BBC News, March 8, 2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7285131.stm (accessed March 8,2008). 
135 Ibid. 
 42
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 43
IV. UKRAINE’S NATO CANDIDACY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Ukraine is an immense country by European standards.  Its 603,700 square 
kilometers make it the largest European state.136  In addition, its Black Sea coastline 
stretches nearly 3,000 km.137  Hence, Ukraine represents a critical geostrategic state 
situated between NATO Europe and Russia.  Russia had influenced and had often 
controlled Ukraine from the latter half of the 1600s to the breakup of the Soviet Union in 
1991.  Moscow helped to form the modern Ukrainian state through imperial acquisitions 
of lands from the Hapsburgs, Hungarians, Poles and Romanians.138  As Sherman Garnett, 
an expert on Ukrainian security studies, aptly observed, “There is in fact an almost 
perfect correlation between a strong Russian state and Ukrainian statelessness.”139 
Nevertheless, Ukraine has emerged from its “statelessness” into a state with a 
veritable national identity (though on occasion domestically divided) that must face a 
reemerging “strong Russian state.”  Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, a 
confrontational relationship has persisted between Russia and Ukraine.  Moreover, 
Ukraine’s identity through self-rule has assuredly altered the relationship; Russia 
undoubtedly must encounter challenges in its strategy toward Ukraine, formerly a key 
part of Russia’s protective layer.  Evidently, a Russian invasion of Ukraine is in current 
circumstances politically improbable and militarily remote, given the weakness of 
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Russia’s conventional military forces.  Unlike Poland and the Baltic states, Ukraine 
cannot currently take cover from Russia under the protective umbrellas of NATO and the 
EU.140 
Having gone through political and social turmoil since the 1990s, Ukraine has 
moved to shed an authoritarian past and establish a fledgling, if teetering, democracy and 
quasi-free market economy.  With its Orange Revolution that arose from controversial 
presidential elections in November 2004, Ukraine demonstrated its desire to look 
westward.141  At times Ukraine has seen its future in both NATO and the EU to protect 
democracy and promote economic prosperity.142  Ukraine’s position nonetheless 
sometimes appears more aligned with that of its former sovereign.  Tendencies to move 
closer to the West have not only fueled increased internal political and social tensions 
between pro-West and pro-Russian groups, but have also aggravated external tensions 
between Ukraine and Russia. 
Given Russia’s rising confidence encouraged by its oil and gas-fueled economic 
resurgence, NATO faces even greater political and diplomatic challenges with the 
prospect of enlargement in Russia’s “sphere of influence,” principally NATO aspirants 
Ukraine and Georgia.  At the same time, many of NATO Europe’s leading states have 
forged greater economic ties with Russia.  As noted in Chapter III, French, German and 
Italian energy companies have all signed major bilateral energy deals with Gazprom since 
2005.  
B. NATO ENLARGEMENT 
1. From Partnership for Peace to Membership 
Initially following the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO governments assumed 
that there would be no need to extend their collective defense organization in post-Cold 
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War Europe.  NATO persisted, however, due to several factors of human nature – “habit, 
inertia, uncertainty, prudence, and corporate interest” in addition to the persistent belief 
in the West that Russia might resume the role of the former “Soviet antagonist.”143  In 
fact, “NATO is a living rather than fossilized security organization and capable of seeing 
that ‘deterrence’ and ‘defense’ will offer very limited protection against post-cold war 
security challenges…NATO membership was synonymous with being part of the west.  
Return to a ‘gray zone’ was synonymous with insecurity.”  Hence, NATO also serves an 
internal and external security role.  First, NATO prevents armed conflict among its 
members and rids Europe of balance-of-power politics.144  Second, NATO ensures U.S. 
cooperation with Europe and averts a return to an isolationist policy.145 
In any case, NATO had not anticipated the magnitude of its future rounds of 
enlargement.  In 1991 U.S. officials made statements implying that former Warsaw Pact 
member states in Central and Eastern Europe should neither anticipate NATO 
membership nor expect security guarantees.146  For example, President George H. W. 
Bush stated in November 1991, “Let’s make them [Central-East European former 
Warsaw Pact states and former Soviet republics] know that we [the NATO Allies] have 
keen interest in their security and in their economic well-being.  But I think it’s premature 
to go beyond that.”147 
NATO did profess, however, to support the development of democracy in these 
states.  The very fact that NATO announced its willingness to support democratic 
advances signifies its transformation from a collective defense pact into a much broader 
political-military instrument with a greater raison d'être and an enhanced vision of 
European security.  Furthermore, the end of the Cold War permitted NATO to set higher 
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requirements for entry into the Alliance.148  Democratization goals have promoted a more 
cohesive Alliance, and NATO has undertaken new international security responsibilities 
within and beyond Europe. 
Partnership for Peace (PfP) provided perhaps the greatest impetus in accelerating 
NATO’s enlargement process.  As noted in the introduction, in 1994 the North Atlantic 
Council established the PfP program to enhance political-military collaboration with non-
NATO countries in the Euro-Atlantic region, which was defined as encompassing the 
territory of the states participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe.  Despite internal divisions, the Clinton Administration promoted a NATO 
enlargement agenda via the PfP program.149 
Though NATO enlargement was politically and strategically difficult for Russia 
to accept, NATO proceeded with two rounds of enlargement following the reunification 
of Germany.  At the 1997 Madrid Summit, the Alliance invited the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, and Poland to join NATO; at the 2002 Prague Summit, the Alliance invited 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia to become 
members.150  Inviting these Central and East European states to join the Alliance proved 
difficult for Russia to accept.  The idea of Ukraine becoming a NATO member, however, 
may overstep Russia’s capacity for tolerance of the NATO enlargement process. 
2. Russia’s Reaction to NATO Enlargement 
Despite the Alliance’s repeated assurances that NATO enlargement does not 
threaten Russia’s security, Moscow has remained wary.  In the 1990s Russia 
unquestionably perceived that NATO enlargement (or “expansion” and “encroachment” 
– terms that better describe Russia’s views of NATO’s policy) represented a military 
threat that might evoke a Russian military response.151  Russian President Boris Yeltsin 
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interpreted NATO enlargement as a negative development for peace and stability.  
Yeltsin declared, “Europe is in danger of plunging into a cold peace.”152  In fact, Yeltsin 
reportedly misunderstood U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher’s October 1993 
presentation of PfP as a means to an end, rather than a stimulus for enlargement, in a 
greater Russian-European post-Cold War security architecture.153 
Critics who share Russia’s objections to NATO enlargement contend that Central 
and East European states have exaggerated the modern security risks of a resurgent 
Russia.  These critics hold that historic troubles between these states and Russia should 
not translate into modern security trepidations.154  It appears that these critics consider 
that Russia’s energy trade policies are intended to bring the country into the globalized 
free market economy and create sustainable growth and productive commercial relations 
with Europe rather than to pursue imperialistic objectives. 
Indeed, Moscow has been the key architect in the establishment of several post-
Cold War security organizations following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the 
Warsaw Pact.  Nevertheless, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) has been 
unproductive and has not materialized into the political-military pact Moscow had 
envisioned as a competitor to NATO and the EU.155  Moreover, Kyiv rejected the May 
1992 Treaty on Collective Security, or Tashkent Treaty, which Moscow had initiated as a 
“regional security structure within the CIS.”156  Moscow and Beijing took the lead in the 
creation of a new pact, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), in June 2001.  
Lastly, in October 2002 Russia established the Collective Security Treaty Organization 
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(CSTO), which evolved from the Tashkent Treaty, as the new “security system in the 
post-Soviet space.”157  The CSTO and the SCO are conceived as collective defense and 
security bodies that may rival NATO and the EU.158 
Ironically, Russia’s security concerns regarding an expanding NATO contrast 
with its own positive developments in cooperation with the Alliance.  Along with 12 
other former Soviet republics, Russia joined PfP in 1994. 159  On the one hand, Russia’s 
PfP membership demonstrated a progressive and potentially budding partnership between 
Moscow and NATO.  On the other hand, Russia’s critics of PfP argued that Moscow’s 
status had been reduced to a level equal with that of its fellow former Soviet republics, 
once parts of its empire.160 
To demonstrate a commitment to improved relations with Russia, however, 
NATO concluded the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, 
Cooperation and Security.  At the 2002 Rome Summit, NATO and Russia decided to 
transform the Permanent Joint Council established by the Founding Act into a more 
ambitious institution called the NATO-Russia Council, “a mechanism for consultation, 
consensus-building, cooperation, joint decision and joint action, in which the individual 
NATO member states and Russia work as equal partners on a wide spectrum of security 
issues of common interest.”161 
Though the NATO-Russia Council has evidently fostered more dialogue, Russia’s 
angst has become greater with the prospect of Ukraine’s NATO candidacy.  Russians 
have questioned the coherence of the Alliance’s policies toward Russia.  NATO professes 
an interest in genuine partnership with Russia yet strives to continue the enlargement 
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process at the possible expense of its relationship with Moscow.  Vladimir Putin voiced 
this concern in his speech at the Munich Conference on Security Policy in 2007: 
[I]t is obvious that NATO expansion does not have any relation with the 
modernisation of the Alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe.  
On the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level 
of mutual trust. And we have the right to ask: against whom is this 
expansion intended? And what happened to the assurances our western 
partners made after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact?162 
In his speech, Putin further noted that Manfred Wörner, then the NATO Secretary 
General, declared in Brussels in May 1990: “The fact that we are ready not to deploy 
NATO troops beyond the territory of the Federal Republic [of Germany] gives the Soviet 
Union firm security guarantees.”163  In Putin’s statement and many others, Russians have 
articulated a sense of having been betrayed or “double-crossed” by NATO. 
  Though the NATO Allies can certainly agree on the importance of pursuing 
positive relations with Russia, a divide persists on the future political and strategic 
orientation of Ukraine, a substantial part of the geographic divide between NATO and 
Russia.  The United States and some of Ukraine’s neighbors, including the Czech 
Republic, Poland and Slovakia, favor a MAP for Ukraine.  In contrast, West European 
NATO Allies, including France, Germany and the Netherlands, express caution in this 
regard.  The NATO Allies which support Ukraine’s pursuit of Alliance membership 
concede nonetheless that this question cannot be considered without equally addressing 
the prospective membership of the Balkan states and Georgia.164 
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C. UKRAINE’S RAPPROCHEMENT TO NATO 
As the Cold War drew to a close, ironically, the United States ineffectually sought 
to keep the Soviet Union intact to contain the potential for ethnic conflict and further 
economic decline in a volatile nuclear weapon state.165  Speaking in Kyiv, Ukraine’s 
capital, on 1 August 1991, U.S. President George H. W. Bush stated, “Yet freedom is not 
the same as independence.  Americans will not support those who seek independence in 
order to replace a far-off tyranny with a local despotism.  They will not aid those who 
promote a suicidal nationalism based upon ethnic hatred.”166  Rejecting the U.S. call for 
Soviet unity, Ukraine followed its nationalist momentum and declared independence just 
three weeks later on 24 August 1991. 
Ukraine has made great advances in its relationship with NATO.  It was the first 
former Soviet republic to join NATO’s PfP.167  Yet, Ukraine underscored its advances in 
cooperation with the Alliance with the establishment of the 1997 NATO-Ukraine Charter 
on a Distinctive Partnership, which created the NATO-Ukraine Commission.168  In 
November 2002, the Commission further launched the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan to 
coordinate defense and economic reforms to close the gap on NATO-Ukraine 
integration.169  The most significant development, and one to which NATO has given 
exceptional attention, has been Kyiv’s military reform.  Democratization has also served 
as a key element in the relationship.170 
Politically, Ukraine has sought to overcome the previous tendency for 
authoritarian governance since the Orange Revolution of late 2004.  Russia has 
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continuously played an influential role in Ukrainian politics and sought to keep Ukraine 
in its sphere of influence and turned away from the West.  Despite its ethnic diversity and 
political struggles, Ukraine has largely avoided violent internal conflict.  Through 
President Yushchenko’s Western-oriented policy, Ukraine has increased overtures to join 
Euro-Atlantic security institutions such as NATO and the European Union (EU), and has 
thus arrived on the verge of political autonomy from Russia.  Though the current tandem 
of Orange Revolution leaders, President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia 
Tymoshenko, has determinedly followed a pro-Western rapprochement policy, the 
majority of the population does not concur with the goal of NATO membership.  With 
respect to Ukrainian accession to NATO, a 2000 poll conducted by a non-profit public 
organization, the Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies (UCEPS), found 
that “only 10.5 percent believe in NATO’s desire to defend Ukraine, and only 37.5 
percent believe that NATO would honor an article 5 commitment if Ukraine actually 
joined NATO.”171  Post-Orange Revolution polls look even bleaker; these sources 
indicate that from less than half to as little as one quarter of Ukraine’s population desires 
integration into NATO.172 
The individual political leaders’ platforms have often further divided the country 
along nationalist lines.  President Yushchenko has continually pushed for more 
cooperation with and from the Alliance, asking on 15 January 2008 for a Membership 
Action Plan (MAP) for Ukraine at the Bucharest Summit.173  In contrast, his opponent in 
the Orange Revolution, Viktor Yanukovych, has remained a steadfast partner with 
Russia.  In the March 2006 Ukrainian parliamentary elections Yanukovych and his 
political party made a startling comeback, and in August 2006 he regained critical power 
and credibility in the government.  Yushchenko resignedly named Yanukovych prime 
minister under the stipulation that he would adhere to a Western-oriented agenda.  As 
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prime minister, however, Yanukovych did not delay in reorienting Ukraine politically 
toward Russia, or more importantly, away from the West.  In Brussels in September 2006 
he gently but assuredly steered Ukraine away from pursuing NATO membership, 
informing NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer that Ukraine would “have to 
take a pause…because of the political situation in Ukraine.”174    
Moreover, Ukraine may wish to present an image of neutrality in its policy 
decisions and economic ties with Russia and the Alliance (that is, Canada, NATO 
Europe, and the United States).  In reality, however, Ukraine has engaged both sides in 
order to, first, pursue its own interests, and second, to defuse domestic tensions.  In other 
words, by remaining a limited participant in the CIS and simply a privileged partner of 
NATO, Ukraine simultaneously calms the pro-West population in western Ukraine and 
the largely pro-Russian residents in eastern Ukraine.175 
Russia feared that if Ukraine acquired complete control of the Black Sea Fleet, 
NATO could prospectively use Sevastopol as a future base – an imaginable but 
unrealistic possibility and simply unacceptable to the Russians.176  This last point has 
lingered in Russian minds as NATO’s enlargement process has included the Baltic states 
and several former Warsaw Pact countries.  In view of the fact that Russia will likely 
maintain its Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol until at least 2017, NATO may take a prudent 
path in moving toward Ukrainian membership while not disrupting its relations with 
Russia. 
Ukraine has independently done its part to dampen tensions with Russia over its 
potential NATO membership.  President Yushchenko has issued repeated assurances to 
Russian authorities that if Ukraine were to join NATO, it would not permit the Alliance 
to establish military bases on its territory.177  In order to reduce tensions with Russia 
while maintaining diplomatic and economic relations, Ukraine must continue to exercise 
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restraint in its political rhetoric.  This approach may also reassure NATO European 
member states which are reticent in their support for a MAP for Kyiv. 
D. THE BUCHAREST SUMMIT AND UKRAINE’S PROSPECTIVE 
MEMBERSHIP 
As noted in the introduction, Gazprom reduced natural gas supplies to Ukraine on 
3 and 4 March 2008.  This move proved timely for two reasons.  First, Russia again 
demonstrated its ability to exploit Ukraine’s gas dependence – barely two weeks after 
Gazprom and Ukraine had supposedly worked out a temporary gas deal.  Moreover, the 
gas reductions tellingly commenced the day after Russia held its presidential elections, 
demonstrating that a change in the Kremlin from Vladimir Putin to Dmitry Medvedev 
would not alter Russia’s foreign policies, including energy relations.  Second, Gazprom’s 
action reminded Europe just one month before NATO’s April 2008 Bucharest Summit of 
the importance of Russia’s geopolitical role as the principal supplier of European energy 
resources. 
Leading up to the Bucharest Summit, MAP tensions circulated within trans-
Atlantic diplomatic circles, as NATO European and Russian leaders revealed in their 
speeches and interviews.  In an attempt to quell the discord between those states for MAP 
status for Ukraine and Georgia and those opposed to it, NATO Secretary General Jaap de 
Hoop Scheffer called for an innovative and extensive strategy to constructively enhance 
the Alliance’s partnership with Russia.178 
Nevertheless, German Chancellor Angela Merkel publicly led the charge in 
opposition to MAP status for Ukraine and Georgia at the Bucharest Summit.  In fact, she 
spoke directly about denying MAP status to these countries on 10 March 2008 in the 
presence of the NATO Secretary General.  Evidently, much speculation has emerged as 
to whether this policy amounts to providing Russia with a “veto” and undermining 
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NATO’s collective defense.179  Exhibiting solidarity with Germany’s argument, French 
Prime Minister François Fillon, upon arrival at the Summit, echoed Merkel’s 
reservations:  “We oppose Georgian and Ukrainian accession [to MAP status] because we 
believe that this is not the right answer in terms of balance of power in Europe and 
between Europe and Russia. We want to conduct a dialogue on this dossier with Russia. 
The President [Nicolas Sarkozy of France] will say these things in Bucharest.”180 
Prior to the Bucharest Summit, even Luxembourg weighed in on the MAP debate.  
Jean Asselborn, Luxembourg’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs 
and Immigration, said, “We have a new president in Russia and I think the European 
Union wants to put its ties with Russia on another footing.  We have to take the interests 
of others, not only of NATO members, into account.”181 
Some NATO European states do not wish to upset growing economic relations, 
namely energy ties, with Russia.  Certain states also continue to fret about the apparent 
relationship between NATO accession and subsequent EU membership.  For example, 
France and the Netherlands did not support MAP decisions for Ukraine or Georgia at 
NATO’s Bucharest Summit, openly voicing a concern that many European Union 
members reportedly share – that a MAP may lead to NATO membership, which in turn 
may provide Ukraine and Georgia a stepping stone to eventual European Union 
membership.182 
Russia also presented its case in the lead up to the NATO summit in Bucharest.  
Following his joint briefing with Merkel in Moscow on 8 March 2008, Putin candidly 
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declared, “Regarding NATO, the Chancellor and I said today that the open-ended 
enlargement of a military-political bloc seems to us not only unnecessary, but also 
harmful and counterproductive.”183  On 21 March 2008, in a rare interview with the 
Western media, Dmitry Medvedev, as Russia’s president-elect, told the Financial Times 
of London: 
I would like to point out separately that we are not happy about the 
situation around Georgia and Ukraine.  We consider that it is extremely 
troublesome for the existing structure of European security.  I would like 
to say that no state can be pleased about having representatives of a 
military bloc to which it does not belong coming close to its borders.  This 
is something that is even more difficult to explain when the vast majority 
of citizens of one of the states, for example of Ukraine, are categorically 
against joining Nato while the government of this state follows a different 
policy.  So this is real democracy.  At the very least in such situations it is 
usual to hold a referendum.184 
Unsurprisingly, Medvedev clearly voices a Russian foreign policy – opposing 
Ukraine’s political autonomy – that has persisted for centuries.  On this issue, Russia has 
the paradoxical support of some of its key West European economic partners.  Moreover, 
some West Europeans have declared that Medvedev must be given an opportunity to 
refresh relations between the Kremlin and Europe.  Putin foreshadowed the direction of 
Russia’s foreign policy under the Medvedev regime: “I do not think our partners will 
have it easier with Medvedev.”185  Putin, however, has expressed a desire to forge closer 
collaboration with NATO despite the disagreement over the possibility of MAP status for 
Ukraine and Georgia, as well as Kosovo’s independence and the U.S. missile defense 
plans in the Czech Republic and Poland.  In fact, he attended the final day of the 
Bucharest Summit, 4 April 2008, to sign an agreement with the Alliance regarding 
NATO’s transit of Russian airspace to deliver logistical support to the International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.  If the Alliance invited Ukraine to join 
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NATO, it could expect little or no Russian cooperation; and Moscow might withdraw the 
transit agreement in support of ISAF. 
Despite the sharp divergences within the Alliance, along with Russia’s adamant 
displeasure at even the most remote consideration of such NATO enlargement, NATO 
members did agree in principle at the Bucharest Summit to bring Ukraine and Georgia 
into the Alliance in the future.  NATO affirmed in its Bucharest Summit Declaration: 
NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for 
membership in NATO.  We agreed today that these countries will become 
members of NATO.  Both nations have made valuable contributions to 
Alliance operations.  We welcome the democratic reforms in Ukraine and 
Georgia … MAP is the next step for Ukraine and Georgia on their direct 
way to membership.  Today we make clear that we support these 
countries’ applications for MAP.  Therefore we will now begin a period of 
intensive engagement with both at a high political level to address the 
questions still outstanding pertaining to their MAP applications.  We have 
asked Foreign Ministers to make a first assessment of progress at their 
December 2008 meeting.  Foreign Ministers have the authority to decide 
on the MAP applications of Ukraine and Georgia.186 
Berlin and Paris unsurprisingly led the opposition to MAP status for Ukraine and 
Georgia at the Bucharest Summit.  Nevertheless, NATO’s declaration certainly points to 
a policy of “not if, but when” for MAPs for Kyiv and Tbilisi.  The lead-up to the 
December 2008 NATO Ministerials may once again provoke clamorous debate and 
potential tensions with Moscow. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Ukraine’s natural gas dependency constitutes a critical factor impinging upon its 
autonomy and consequently leading to divisions with regard to NATO membership 
aspirations.  Ukraine remains nationalistically fractured between western Ukraine, which 
is influenced by its cultural heritage and historic ties with Poland and Lithuania, and 
eastern Ukraine and Crimea, the regions where the population proudly maintains its 
Russian-speaking identity and heritage.  Though a flawed presidential election in 2004 
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receives credit for triggering the Orange Revolution, the country’s national divide 
provided the impetus behind the demonstrations for greater democracy and an improved 
civil society. 
For the foreseeable future, Ukraine will not realistically be able to reduce its 
natural gas dependency on Russia.  Alternative sources must become available.  
Nevertheless, by appropriately paying off its energy debts to Russia and resisting the 
temptation of subsidized prices rather than responsibly moving to global market prices 
for natural gas, as well as striving for democratic and military reform, Ukraine will 
augment its economic choices and reduce political constraints due to energy dependency.  
Greater autonomy from Russia will logically make Ukraine a more appealing ally to 
West European NATO members.  Nevertheless, NATO European member states’ 
bilateral energy agreements with Russia may (a) in fact supersede any prospects for 









A. AN AMALGAMATION OF “BUFFER” AND “ENERGY TRANSIT” 
STATE ROLES 
NATO enlargement and the European Union’s growing dependence on external 
energy supplies controlled by Russia have simultaneously developed into crucial security 
issues in Europe.  The emerging interaction between Alliance enlargement and energy 
policies may yet affect Ukraine’s future relationship with NATO as well as Russia and 
even determine which direction NATO takes regarding Ukraine’s candidacy for 
membership.  As former U.S. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski 
unequivocally declared in 1994:  “It cannot be stressed enough that without Ukraine, 
Russia ceases to be an empire, but with Ukraine suborned and then subordinated, Russia 
automatically becomes an empire.”187 
Although Russia has formed productive partnerships with NATO and the EU, 
Moscow regards NATO enlargement along its borders as threatening.  “Losing” Ukraine 
to NATO would be perceived by many Russians as a strategic and psychological defeat 
for Moscow, regardless of the potential for greater cooperation with the Alliance. 
Russia has sought to exert influence in other former Soviet republics.  In order to 
maintain a leadership role in its traditional sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space, 
Russia has helped to organize various post-Cold War international organizations, e.g., the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Collective Security Treaty Organization 
(CSTO), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).  Though Russia has largely 
failed to gain Kyiv’s participation in these organizations, with the exception of the CIS, it 
has retained some geopolitical influence over Ukraine. 
In essence, Ukraine has served as Russia’s buffer state with NATO Europe.  The 
renowned British international relations scholar, Martin Wight, defined a buffer state as 
“a weak power between two or more stronger ones, maintained or even created with the 
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purpose of reducing conflict between them.”188  Russia recognizes, however, that with a 
weak conventional military force in a globalized political and economic system, it cannot 
retain its traditional authority over Ukraine.  Interestingly, while Russia appears to regard 
Ukraine as a traditional buffer state for security purposes, Moscow must also contend 
with the fact that Ukraine has been and remains a critically important transit state for 
energy trade.  As Ukraine’s role as a buffer state might disappear if NATO invited 
Ukraine to join the Alliance, Russia has sought to reduce Ukraine’s functional 
importance as an energy transit state and has found some partners in this endeavor among 
the major states of NATO Europe. 
Ukraine’s dependence on Russian energy, natural gas in particular, reduces its 
political weight in managing its relationship with Russia.  Hence, Russia can exert greater 
leverage over Ukraine by concluding huge bilateral energy contracts with key NATO 
European member states while the European Union continues to flounder in search of a 
common energy policy.  For its own security concerns and geopolitical influence, Russia 
wishes to prevent Ukraine’s entry into NATO.  Moscow is evidently striving to maintain 
Ukraine as a buffer state while utilizing pipeline projects such as Nord Stream and South 
Stream to diminish Ukraine’s geostrategic energy status from that of a principal transit 
state to that of a secondary transit state.  If Moscow can succeed in these aims, it will 
achieve its immediate political-military and economic goals, and may in the long term 
regain its great power status. 
B. A FINE BALANCE BETWEEN PARTNERSHIPS AND A POWER 
VACUUM 
On the eve of the April 2008 Bucharest Summit, Grigory Karasin, State Secretary 
of Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, cautioned:  “Ukrainian movement toward 
[NATO] membership would trigger a deep crisis in Russia-Ukraine relations and would 
impact upon European security as a whole.”189  Germany’s Foreign Minister, Frank-
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Walter Steinmeier, while visiting Yekaterinburg, a major Russian industrial city east of 
the Ural Mountains, expressed a similar point of view in May 2008:   “I am convinced 
that there can be no security in Europe, in the entire Eurasian area, without – much less 
against – Russia.”190  Moscow does in fact play a key role in the security of Europe, 
especially with regard to Ukraine.  Putin has reportedly stated that if Kyiv were to join 
NATO, Ukraine would “cease to exist as a state.”191  Certainly, Moscow could exploit 
Ukraine’s east-west divide to create internal turmoil and could also support agitation for 
Crimea’s secession from Ukraine.192   
Conversely, improved energy ties between Russia and Ukraine could enhance 
Europe’s overall security situation.  Many analysts argue that Russia imposes its will on 
Ukraine through the energy market.  Chapter II concluded that though Russia’s control 
over supply and pricing may be used as leverage, Russia has economic as well as political 
incentives to increase prices and eliminate subsidies.  This point has resonated even more 
in Moscow since Ukraine has joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) while Russia 
still awaits membership.  Moreover, Central Asian suppliers plan to raise their gas prices 
in sales to Russia in conformity with world market rates in 2009.193  The entire post-
Soviet space is transitioning to market-based energy prices in great contrast to what these 
economies experienced for several decades under the Soviet centrally planned economic 
system. 
Evidently, Russia has objectives beyond using its natural gas as a foreign policy 
tool against Ukraine.  As discussed in Chapter III, Russia has focused on improving its 
economic performance.  Vladimir Putin gladly assumed his role as prime minister in May 
2008 to continue to shape the economy and implement his version of “state capitalism.”  
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If Russia succeeds in blocking Ukraine’s entry into NATO through its energy 
partnerships with major NATO European powers, Russia will have achieved a “win-win” 
outcome. 
C. A CALL FOR COOPERATIVE AND COMPLEMENTARY POLICIES 
Ukraine depends profoundly on Russian energy and Russian gas pipelines from 
Turkmenistan for domestic consumption and an energy-intensive and heavy-industry-
based economy.  Ukraine’s energy dilemma derives not only from turbulent relations 
with Russia but also from a disjointed energy policy and ineffectual domestic 
institutions.194  Energy policy often consists of pushing energy traders’ debt and energy 
waste losses onto the state budget.  Thus, the state must forfeit funds that could otherwise 
be used to enhance, reform, and reorganize the country’s infrastructure, services, and 
institutions.195 
As noted previously, the European Union lacks a cohesive and cooperative energy 
security policy.  NATO’s relationship with Russia shows a parallel lack of coherence.  As 
Karl-Heinz Kamp, the research director of the NATO Defense College in Rome, has 
astutely observed:  “There is no NATO policy toward Russia that is accepted by all 
members.  Even on the continent, the positions of the East-Central Europeans differ 
markedly from those of their Western counterparts.”196  Nevertheless, as EU and Russian 
representatives prepare to meet in Siberia for a June 2008 summit to begin talks regarding 
a renewed EU-Russia strategic partnership, the prospects for a constructive dialogue 
appear optimistic.  Moreover, Warsaw has proposed an “Eastern Partnership” to its EU 
partners to ensure that states between and along Russia’s and the EU’s periphery 
(Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, and in time, Belarus) concomitantly 
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strengthen ties with the EU.197  Poland’s proposal calls for a cooperative approach that 
the EU and the Alliance should continue to strive for. 
It is noteworthy in this regard that Pierre Noël, a researcher at the Electricity 
Policy Research Group (EPRG) at Cambridge University and the European Council on 
Foreign Relations, has suggested a cohesive policy for the European Union: 
A European integrated and flexible gas market would make eastern 
Europe more secure, just as it would make the relationship between 
Gazprom and large utility importers in Germany, Italy or France less cosy.  
This is a better position from which to speak with one voice to 
Moscow.198 
Closer cooperation in the EU and NATO would thus be a straightforward and 
sound remedy to energy security and NATO enlargement tensions.  Ultimately, greater 
cooperation among individual states as well as international institutions would better 
serve all parties in the greater European security architecture.  Whatever decision NATO 
takes regarding Ukraine’s possible membership in the Alliance, it should not allow 
extraneous interests, e.g., economic ties and energy policies, to override political-military 
objectives.  An enhanced strategic relationship between NATO and Russia as vital 
partners should complement a common EU energy security policy regarding Russia and 
other suppliers.  This would benefit the Alliance, the EU, Kyiv, and Moscow. 
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